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Decomposition of  ethnic heterogeneity on growth 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ethnic heterogeneity influences economic growth through various channels such as 
efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress. However, it is 
open to discussion exactly how ethnic heterogeneity affects these channels. Hence, this 
paper attempts to examine the effects of  heterogeneity on economic growth using data 
envelopment analysis. The empirical results of  the estimations show that heterogeneity has 
a negative effect on efficiency improvements. However, heterogeneity has no effect on 
technological progress and capital accumulation. This implies that ethnic heterogeneity 
hinders positive externalities such as information spillover, which hampers economic 
growth. 
  
Running title: Ethnic heterogeneity on growth 
Keywords: Ethnic fractionalization, Ethnic polarization, Efficiency improvement, Capital 
accumulation. 
JEL classification: H11, O43  
 
 
 
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing interest among economic researchers in 
the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005). Easterly and Levine (1997) showed a negative association between ethnic 
heterogeneity and economic growth. Ethnic heterogeneity may influence economic growth 
through a variety of  channels. First, ethnic heterogeneity is found to reduce investment 
(Mauro, 1995; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b).1 Hence, the heterogeneity 
reduced capital accumulation, impeding economic growth2. Second, ethnic heterogeneity is 
positively associated with the probability of  conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 
2005b), while heterogeneity is negatively related to trust (Dincer, 2011)3. Trust plays a key 
role in reducing transaction costs in the market (Zak and Knack, 2001). Thus, I predict that 
ethnic heterogeneity impedes not only market transactions but also information spillover 
(learning from others). This inevitably hinders economic growth. Third, heterogeneity, 
however, appears to have a contrasting effect: social diversity (which seems to be captured 
partly by ethic heterogeneity) is thought to cause innovation (Jacobs, 1969, 1984). If  this is 
true, then heterogeneity is thought to enhance economic growth. Therefore, the effect of  
ethnic heterogeneity on growth is open for discussion. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate 
through which channels ethnic heterogeneity affects growth.  
Data envelopment analysis (hereafter, DEA) enables me to analyze channels of  
economic growth. DEA constructs a world production frontier and then decomposes labor 
productivity growth to three components: technological catch-up, capital deepening, and 
technological change (Kumar and Russell, 2002). In addition, researchers can use regression 
analysis to examine how initial outputs per worker influence these components (Yamamura 
and Shin, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Yamamura, 2011). Hence, this paper uses DEA. 
This paper aims to examine influence of  heterogeneity on growth and so provide 
new empirical evidence by analyzing the channels through which the heterogeneity affects 
growth. The key finding is that heterogeneity has a negative effect on efficiency 
improvements, which results in the impediment of  growth. In contrast, heterogeneity has 
no effect on technological progress and capital accumulation. The rest part of  this paper is 
organized as follows: a testable hypothesis is proposed in Section 2; Section 3 describes the 
                                                   
1 Previous works examined the effect of  religious heterogeneity on economic development, which 
relate to works exploring the influence of  ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2003). 
2 Alesina et al. (1999) used United States data to show that shares of  spending on productive public 
goods are inversely related to a city’s (metro area’s/county’s) ethnic fragmentation. 
3 Heterogeneity is found to influence government size (Lind, 2007). This also possibly affects economic 
performance and growth. 
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data and estimation strategy; Section 4 exhibits the estimation results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS 
 
The engine of  economic growth seems to stem from information spillover (Marshall, 
1920). Positive externalities, via information spillover among various firms and groups, are 
expected to arise if  face-to-face interaction among workers occurs.4 Information spillover 
is considered to enhance efficiency improvement, resulting in economic growth. However, 
various types of  workers including experts are less likely to interact if  workers are polarized. 
Easterly (2001) argued, “Suppose that people in linguistic groups associated primarily with 
people from their group and not with people from other groups. Then the knowledge 
creation coming from highly educated is valuable to you only if  those people consist of  
your own group. Knowledge leaks within ethnic groups and not across ethnic groups” 
(Easterly, 2001, 271–272). This is consistent with the argument that information flows are 
weaker in a heterogeneous population, which prevents individuals from learning about their 
neighbors’ experiences (Munshi, 2004). If  this holds true, heterogeneity has a detrimental 
influence on information spillover. Furthermore, there appears to be a further mechanism. 
It is argued that trust contributes to economic growth (e.g., Beugelsdijk, et al., 2004; 
Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005; Zak and Knack, 2001). This is in part because trust 
reduces the transaction cost among agents. However, Dincer (2011) provided evidence that 
ethnic heterogeneity is negatively associated with the level of  trust. If  this is true, then 
heterogeneity reduces trust and therefore increases transaction costs. Inevitably, the market 
does not function well, which in turn reduces positive externalities such as information 
spillover. Accordingly, economic growth is hindered. This argument leads me to postulate 
Hypothesis 15: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Racial heterogeneity impedes efficiency improvements, which hampers 
economic growth. 
 
 Ethnic heterogeneity is considered to increase the number of  interest groups 
because the interests of  each group are diverse and conflicting. A rent-seeking model 
                                                   
4 Thornton and Thompson (2001), using micro-level data on wartime shipbuilding, suggest that 
learning spillovers were a significant source of  productivity growth. 
5 Mauro (1995) exhibits a negative and significant correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and 
institutional efficiency. Institutional efficiency is positively associated with economic efficiency. It follows 
then, with the exception of  the information spillover channel, that ethnic heterogeneity impedes 
efficiency improvements.  
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shows that resources spent by each group to obtain political power can be considered a 
social cost (Mueller, 2003). In this model resources are allocated to nonproductive behavior 
and not into productive investments. To put it in another way, heterogeneity causes 
rent-seeking behavior and so reduces investment. It is also possible that that ethnic 
heterogeneity increases the likelihood of  political conflict, creating an instable and 
uncertain country. As a consequence, investment is reduced in a heterogeneous society 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b)6. Considering the arguments above, I propose 
hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Racial heterogeneity impedes capital accumulation, which hampers economic 
growth. 
 
Diversified cities play an important role in enlarging the possibility of  innovation 
(Jacobs, 1969, 1984). This role is more important for new industries where new products 
and production methods are established through trial and error, than compared with 
mature industries (Hendrson et al., 1995). Based on United States data, Glaeser et al. (1992) 
provided evidence that the more diverse an industrial structure is, the higher the growth 
rate of  productivities.7 Different ethnic groups are likely to work in different industries. 
Therefore, ethnic heterogeneity seems to create diversity within a country. Assuming that 
the diversity of  industrial structure is captured by ethnic heterogeneity, racial heterogeneity 
enhances technology progress through innovation, resulting in economic growth. 
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
Kumar and Russell (2002) used DEA to construct a cross-country data set by 
decomposing labor productivity growth into three components. They conducted a simple 
OLS regression model with output per worker from 1965 as the independent variables and 
the dependent variables were the percentage changes between 1965 and 1990 for output 
per worker, technological change, the efficiency index, and the capital accumulation index. 
In their estimations, both unobservable individual and time effects were ignored. This led 
to estimation bias. 
                                                   
6 A secured property right is considered to provide an incentive to invest and therefore creates capital 
accumulation. Isaksson (2011) used cross-countries data to present evidence that social division 
measured in terms of  ethnic fractionalization weakens the association between property rights 
institutions and income. If  this is true, then heterogeneity reduces the incentive to invest even when 
property rights are well secured. 
7 Yamamura and Shin (2007b) used Japanese data to conduct similar estimations. However, they found 
that industrial diversity did not have a positive effect on technological progress and labor-productivity. 
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Following Kumar and Russell (2002), this paper also uses DEA to construct a panel 
dataset for 57 countries, from 1965 to 1990, using the Penn World Table.8 With this 
dataset, I used random-effects estimations to reduce omitted variable bias caused by the 
time-invariant features of  the various countries.9 I also incorporated year dummies into 
this model to capture individually invariant time-specific effects. The estimated function 
takes the following form:  
GriT-to =α0 +α1 Ln(Output) it0 +α2 (Ethnic polarization) i +α3 (Number of  natural disasters)it0 
+α4 (Government size) it0 +α5 (Years of  schooling) it0 +α6 (French legal origin) i +α7 (Brithish legal 
origin) i +α8(Latitude) i +α9(Land size) i + ti ne + +uit,  
where GriT-to represents labor productivity growth and the change in any of  the 
three dependent variables (i.e., Efficiency, Capital, and Technique) in country i from each base 
year t0 to year T (t0 = 1965, …, 1989 and T = 1966, …, 1990).α represents regression 
parameters, e  is the time-invariant individual effect of  each country, n  represents the 
year specific effects, and u is an error term. As stated earlier, e and n  are controlled. The 
key independent variable that captures ethnic heterogeneity is the ethnic polarization index. 
Classical works have previously used an ethnic fractionalization index to capture ethnic 
heterogeneity (Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997). The index is defined as 
                        
where, if  I consider ethnic diversity, is the proportion of  people who profess 
to belong to ethnic group i. Basically, this indicator can be interpreted as measuring the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different 
groups. 
In addition to the ethnic fractionalization index, an ethnic polarization index has 
also been developed and used as an alternative measure (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 
2005a, 2005b; Reynal-Querol, 2002). The ethnic polarization index can be defined as 
. 
This index measures the normalized distance of a particular distribution of ethnic 
groups within a bimodal distribution.  
                                                   
8 Kumar and Russell (2002) admitted that their method includes the possibility of  an implosion of  the 
technological frontier. Henderson and Russell (2005) precluded an implosion of  the frontier over time. 
In this paper, it is also precluded.  
9 The independent variables used in this paper were not available for 10 of  the 57 countries. Hence, the 
data from only 47 countries were used in the estimation.  
6 
 
To check the robustness of  the estimation results, I used both ethnic 
fractionalization and ethnic polarization as proxy variables for ethnic heterogeneity. 10 
Ethnic heterogeneity is expected to result in conflict, hampering the cooperation and 
communication required to enhance technology diffusion, and therefore efficiency 
improvements. Proxies for ethnic heterogeneity hold time-invariant features. Hence, their 
effects cannot be estimated when a fixed-effects model is used. To examine these effects, a 
random-effects model is used in this paper. If  the coefficients of  the proxies take the 
negative sign when efficiency improvement (and capital accumulation) is a dependent 
variable, then Hypothesis 1 (and 2) are supported. 
The other independent variables used in this model are the values in the base year 
t0. I have incorporated per capita GDP taken in log-form in t0 to control for initial levels 
of  productivity. These data are sourced from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.3).11 Natural 
disasters are considered to influence economic growth (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). To 
capture this effect, the number of  natural disasters that have occurred in the sample 
countries are included.12 As suggested by Yamamura (2011), government size hinders 
capital accumulation and so hampers economic growth. Hence, government size is 
included as an independent variable. Government size is measured by a country’s general 
government final consumption expenditure (% of  GDP) sourced from the World Bank 
(2006). To capture the human capital effect, the number of  years at school is incorporated, 
as used by Easterly and Levine (1997).13  
 Institutional factors appear to play an important role in determining 
economic growth. A number of  previous works have shown that legal origin is profoundly 
associated with incentives for economic agents and, therefore, economic performance (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008). Better-developed financial systems contribute to 
growth in capital-intensive sectors (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Further, Levine (1998) 
argued that legal origin exogenously determined the degree of  financial development that 
promoted economic growth. La Porta et al. (1998) asserted that French civil-law countries 
offer the weakest legal protection to investors while British common law countries offer 
                                                   
10 Data on ethnic fractionalization and polarization is available at 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
11 The data are available from Center of  International Comparisons at the University of  Pennsylvania. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed May 1, 2007).  
12 The data were obtained from the International Disaster Database http://www.emdat.be (accessed on 
June 1, 2011). 
13 The number of  years at school is available only for 1960, 1970, and 1980. Therefore, to construct the 
panel data, additional data were generated by interpolation based on the assumption of  constant 
changes in rates to compensate for this deficiency. After 1980, the value for 1980 is used. The data are 
available from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20
700002~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html (accessed June 2, 2011).  
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the strongest. French and British legal origin dummies are incorporated to capture these 
effects.14 Apart from institutional factors, geographical factors such as latitude and land 
size are incorporated as independent variables to capture the existence of  natural resources 
and climate. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The estimation results of  the random-effects model with year dummy variables from 
1966 to 1990 are reported in Tables 1–4. Table 1 presents the results when 
labor-productivity growth is used as a dependent variable. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the 
results when efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress are 
used as independent variables. The ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization indexes 
are used as a proxy for ethnic heterogeneity in each table. In all columns in Tables 1–4, 
with the exception of  column (3), Table 4, the Hausman test does not reject the 
null-hypothesis that the differences in coefficients between a fixed-effects model and a 
random-effects model are not systematic. This result implies that the random-effects model 
is valid and preferred.  
I see from Table 1 that ethnic fractionalization yields the negative sign in columns 
(1)–(3) and that ethnic polarization produces the negative sign in columns (4)–(6). 
Furthermore, they are statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. This implies 
that ethnic heterogeneity hampers labor-productivity growth. In addition, number of  
natural disasters shows a significant positive sign in columns (1)–(3) and (4), which is 
consistent with the argument of  Skidmore and Toya (2002), where natural disasters may 
stimulate economic growth. Other variables do not show a significant sign, with the 
exception of  latitude in column (3), and hence they do not influence growth. 
With respect to Table 2, the coefficient signs of  ethnic fractionalization are negative in 
columns (1)–(3), and that of  ethnic polarization are also negative in columns (4)–(6). In 
addition, they are statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. I interpret this result 
as suggesting that ethnic heterogeneity impedes information spillover. The result of  the 
proxy of  ethnic heterogeneity in Table 2 is similar to that in Table 1. Hence, the 
detrimental effect of  ethnic heterogeneity on growth comes in part from the detrimental 
                                                   
14 Besides legal origins, institutional factors captured by, for instance, corruption and 
transparency of government appear to influence economic growth. However, the 
variables used to capture them are regarded as endogenous variables because the 
causality between these factors and economic growth is ambiguous. Hence, these 
variables lead to estimation bias and are not used in this paper. In contrast, legal origin 
is related to historical event. Therefore, legal origin dummies can be considered as 
exogenous variables and are used in this paper. 
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effect of  ethnic heterogeneity on information spillover. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not strongly 
supported by the result. Concerning the other variables, the results are almost identical to 
the results presented in Table 1. 
I see from Table 3 that the signs of  the proxies for ethnic heterogeneity are negative in 
all columns. However, they are not statistically significant with the exception of  column (1). 
Ethnic heterogeneity does not affect capital accumulation, which is not consistent with the 
argument that ethnic heterogeneity reduces investment (Mauro, 1995). Hence, Hypothesis 2 
is not supported by the results. Considering Tables 1–4 jointly, I assert that ethnic 
heterogeneity impedes information spillover rather than investment. Furthermore, ethnic 
heterogeneity does not affect innovation. The combined effects of  ethnic heterogeneity 
become negative on growth. Thus, I conclude that ethnic heterogeneity is an obstacle 
rather than an engine of  economic growth. 
Turning to Table 4, ethnic fractionalization and polarization take negative signs, with 
the exception of  column (5). They do not become statistically significant in any of  the 
columns. It follows from this result that ethnic heterogeneity does not enhance innovation. 
This is not in line with the argument of  Jacobs (1969, 1984).15 The other independent 
variables do not show any results, and do not change according to the specifications. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
There are conflicting views regarding the role of  heterogeneity (or diversity) on 
growth. Social heterogeneity is considered to impede investment, reducing capital 
accumulation. What is more, heterogeneity is thought to hinder information spillover, 
which hampers efficiency improvement. These have a detrimental effect on economic 
growth. In contrast, face-to-face interactions among workers belonging to different 
industries are considered to act as a catalyst for innovation, leading to technological 
progress (Jacobs 1969, 1984). This in turn stimulates economic growth. This paper 
attempts to examine the influence of  heterogeneity on economic growth by scrutinizing 
the channels through which heterogeneity affects such growth. 
For this purpose, this study used panel data from 47 countries, from 1965 to 1989, 
to decompose the effect of  ethnic heterogeneity, and to examine how it influences 
economic growth. Using a random-effects regression model with year dummies, I found 
that ethnic heterogeneity has a negative effect on growth, mainly by hampering efficiency 
improvement, but not capital accumulation nor technological progress. I interpret these 
                                                   
15 In this paper, I assumed that the role of  industrial diversity stressed by Jacobs (1969, 1984) could be 
captured by the role of  ethnic heterogeneity. However, there seems to be a gap between industrial 
diversity and ethnic heterogeneity. Hence, special care should be called for when interpreting the results 
of  Table 3. 
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results to imply that ethnic heterogeneity hinders cooperation and communication among 
individuals; however, cooperation and communication are important for technology 
diffusion as well. As a consequence, efficiency improvement is hampered, thereby impeding 
economic growth. In contrast, heterogeneity does not affect innovation and capital 
accumulation.  
Information spillover plays an important role for developing countries; it enables 
them to catch up with more developed countries because it is otherwise difficult for them 
to create new technology (Vernon, 1966). From the findings in this paper, I derive the 
argument that heterogeneity is an obstacle to economic development, particularly for 
developing countries trying to catch up with developed countries via the acquisition of  
advanced technology. 
Information spillover, via interactions among workers from various industries, is 
thought to largely occur in urban rather than suburban and rural areas (Jacobs, 1969, 1984). 
Geographical factors were not considered in this research when the estimations were 
conducted because this paper used country-level macro data. Micro-level data should be 
used to more closely explore the effect of  heterogeneity on information spillover and 
therefore efficiency improvement. Furthermore, the influence of  institutional factors on 
investment differs between private and public investment (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana, 2008). However, due to data limitations, I was unable to examine how 
heterogeneity influences private and public capital accumulation. These remaining issues 
can be addressed in future research. 
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Table 1. Determinants of  labor-productivity growth (random-effects estimates: 1965–1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Year dummies are not reported but are included in all estimations as independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)   (6) 
Ln(Output) -0.007** 
  (-2.02)- 
-0.006 
  (-1.56)- 
-0.007 
  (-1.60)- 
-0.002 
  (-0.66)- 
-0.004 
  (-0.92)- 
-0.003 
  (-0.72)- 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.044*** 
(-5.33) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.043*** 
(-4.36) 
   
Ethnic polarization 
 
   -0.036*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.034*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.32) 
Number of  natural 
disasters 
0.001*** 
(2.63) 
0.001*** 
(2.61) 
0.001*** 
(2.54) 
0.001 
(1.45) 
0.001 
(1.52) 
0.001* 
(1.70) 
Government size 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.27) 
-0.0004 
(-1.27) 
-0.0003 
(-0.97) 
-0.0006 
(-1.68) 
-0.0005 
(-1.44) 
-0.0005 
(-1.43) 
Years of  schooling 
 
0.001 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
0.001 
(1.04) 
French legal origin 
 
 -0.005 
(-0.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
 -0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
British legal origin 
 
 -0.004 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
 -0.005 
(-0.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
Latitude 
 
  0.019** 
(2.03) 
  0.013 
(1.23) 
Land size 
 
  -0.97*109 
(-0.24) 
  -1.48*109 
(-1.17) 
Hausman test 
 
8.99 
p-value = 0.99 
8.89 
p-value = 0.99 
10.6 
p-value = 0.64 
11.2 
p-value = 1.00 
10.5 
p-value = 1.00 
10.7 
p-value = 1.00 
Groups 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 
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Table 2. Determinants of  efficiency improvement (random-effects estimates: 1965–1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Year dummies are not reported but are included in all estimations as independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)   (6) 
Ln(Output) -0.004 
  (-1.57)- 
-0.002 
  (-0.81)- 
-0.003 
  (-0.97)- 
-0.001 
  (-0.62)- 
-0.001 
  (-0.34)- 
-0.001 
  (-0.28)- 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.023*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.027*** 
(-3.82) 
   
Ethnic polarization 
 
   -0.023*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.69) 
Number of  natural 
disasters 
0.001*** 
(2.59) 
0.001*** 
(2.53) 
0.001** 
(2.47) 
0.001 
(1.55) 
0.001 
(1.40) 
0.001 
(1.39) 
Government size 
 
0.005* 
(1.84) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
0.005* 
(1.94) 
0.0003 
(1.39) 
0.0003 
(1.20) 
0.0003 
(1.33) 
Years of  schooling 
 
0.0002 
(0.26) 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
-0.0003 
(-0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.20) 
0.0001 
(0.17) 
0.0001 
(0.18) 
French legal origin 
 
 -0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.30) 
 0.003 
(0.64) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
British legal origin 
 
 0.003 
(0.65) 
0.005 
(0.40) 
 0.004 
(0.91) 
0.006 
(1.16) 
Latitude 
 
  0.015** 
(2.21) 
  0.010 
(1.44) 
Land size 
 
  0.05*109 
(0.06) 
  -0.46*109 
(-0.53) 
Hausman test 
 
28.8 
p-value = 0.41 
28.2 
p-value = 0.44 
31.5 
p-value = 0.29 
24.6 
p-value = 0.64 
24.6 
p-value = 0.64 
26.4 
p-value = 0.55 
Groups 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 
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Table 3. Determinants of  capital accumulation (random-effects estimates: 1965–1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Year dummies are not reported but are included in all estimations as independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)   (6) 
Ln(Output) 0.003 
  (1.39)- 
0.002 
  (1.16)- 
0.004* 
  (1.71)- 
0.004** 
  (2.00)- 
0.003 
  (1.46)- 
0.004* 
  (1.86)- 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.012** 
(-2.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.41) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
   
Ethnic polarization 
 
   -0.008 
(-1.47) 
-0.005 
(-0.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
Number of  natural 
disasters 
0.0003 
(1.37) 
0.0003 
(1.36) 
0.0004 
(1.60) 
0.0003 
(1.18) 
0.0003 
(1.22) 
0.0003 
(1.22) 
Government size 
 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.0008*** 
(-4.94) 
Years of  schooling 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
0.0005 
(0.62) 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
0.0006 
(0.69) 
French legal origin 
 
 -0.005 
(-0.97) 
-0.003 
(-0.74) 
 -0.005 
(0.89) 
-0.003 
(0.66) 
British legal origin 
 
 -0.006 
(-1.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
 -0.007 
(-1.37) 
-0.003 
(-0.62) 
Latitude 
 
  0.002 
(0.34) 
  0.002 
(0.29) 
Land size 
 
  2.17*109** 
(2.26) 
  -2.26*109** 
(-2.47) 
Hausman test 
 
29.2 
p-value = 0.41 
30.8 
p-value = 0.32 
25.7 
p-value = 0.58 
28.1 
p-value = 0.45 
29.9 
p-value = 0.36 
23.8 
p-value = 0.68 
Groups 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 
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Table 4. Determinants of  technological progress (random-effects estimates: 1965–1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Year dummies are not reported but are included in all estimations as independent variables. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In column (3), the model fitted on these data failed to meet the 
asymptotic assumptions of  the Hausman test and so a p-value could not be obtained. 
 
 
 
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)   (6) 
Ln(Output) -0.0003 
  (-0.29) 
0.0004 
  (0.32)- 
0.0001 
  (0.07)- 
-0.0001 
  (-0.15)- 
0.0005 
  (0.48)- 
0.0004 
  (0.38)- 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.001 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.80) 
   
Ethnic polarization 
 
   -0.003 
(-0.16) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
-0.0001 
(-0.04) 
Number of  natural 
disasters 
0.0003* 
(1.65) 
0.0003* 
(1.66) 
0.0003 
(1.46) 
0.0003 
(1.58) 
0.0003 
(1.60) 
0.0002 
(1.40) 
Government size 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.90) 
-0.0001 
(-1.11) 
-0.0001 
(-0.92) 
-0.0001 
(-0.93) 
-0.0001 
(-1.13) 
-0.0001 
(-1.01) 
Years of  schooling 
 
0.0002 
(0.69) 
0.0002 
(0.06) 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.69) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
French legal origin 
 
 -0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
 -0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
British legal origin 
 
 0.001 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
 0.0003 
(0.18) 
0.0001 
(0.08) 
Latitude 
 
  0.001 
(0.27) 
  0.001 
(0.21) 
Land size 
 
  0.27*109 
(0.73) 
  0.14*109 
(0.41) 
Hausman test 
 
5.97 
p-value = 1.00 
5.30 
p-value = 1.00 
-46.9 
 
6.57 
p-value = 1.00 
5.70 
p-value = 1.00 
7.23 
p-value = 1.00 
Groups 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 1121 
